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ALWAYS ALREADY SUSPECT: REVISING
VULNERABILITY THEORY*
FRANK RUDY COOPER**

Martha Fineman proposes a post-identity "vulnerability"
approach that focuses on burdens we all share; this article argues
that theory needs to incorporate recognition of how invisible
privileges exacerbate some people's burdens. Vulnerability
theory is based on a recognition that we are all born defenseless,
become feeble, must fear naturaldisasters, and might be failed by
social institutions. It thus argues for a strong state that takes
affirmative steps to insure substantive equality of opportunity.
While vulnerability theory might help explain and remedy
situations like Hurricane Katrina, it also might be susceptible to
an argument that racialprofiling is a necessary sacrifice of those
overrepresented in arrest statistics for the greater good of
protecting the majorityfrom vulnerability to crime.
I argue that acknowledging relative privilege can help us analyze
practices such as racial profiling. Privileges are invisible,
unearned assets that automatically attach to people because an
aspect of their identity is made socially normative. Because
privileges can make the impact of racially targeted policing of
others invisible to their holders, vulnerability theory needs to
incorporatethis concept if it wishes to address racialprofiling. A
revised vulnerability theory could then use the fact of our shared
vulnerabilities and its justification of a strong state to call for
extensive federal monitoring of policing. Linking vulnerability
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theory to analysis of privilege is a necessary precursor to such a
conversation.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has a problem: police officers
continue to target men of color for suspicion of wrongdoing.' For
1. "Racial profiling" occurs when individuals or institutions use racial characteristics
to associate individuals possessing those characteristics with bad behavior. See, e.g., Frank
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity
Performance,and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 853,857-58 (2006) (describing image
of the "Bad Black Man" as rooted in stereotype of black male criminality); Neil Gotanda,
Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1689, 1691 (2000) (detailing racial profiling of a Chinese scientist as a spy); Bernard
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example, Judge Shira Scheindlin found as fact that the New York City
'2
Police Department's ("NYPD") aggressive "order-maintenance
stop and frisk3 program disproportionately hounded young men of
color and was not justified by any disparities in arrest or crime
statistics.4 To respond, we need a capacious theory for addressing
differential policing of men of color.
In light of ongoing police racial profiling, the recent trend of
construing equality as requiring a move beyond identities is a turn in
the wrong direction. For instance, consider the "colorblind" and
"antibalkanization" post-identity approaches. Colorblindness is
exemplified by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts's
argument that the way to end racial inequality is to act as though race

E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and
Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1275, 1283-84 (2004) (showing how racial profiling is illogical); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 962
(1999) (arguing that police use stereotypes of blacks as criminals).
2. Order-maintenance policing, sometimes known as "quality of life" policing,
involves arresting people for petty offenses, such as sneaking. free rides in public
transportation or trying to squeegee car windows for tips, in order to improve the quality
of life, particularly for mainstream civilians. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street
Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 457, 461-62 (2000) (explaining order-maintenance policing); K. Babe Howell,
Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance
Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276-80 (2009) (describing the
development and problems with order-maintenance policing in New York City). Ordermaintenance policing derives from "broken windows" theory, which notes that if you let
one window remain broken, it may encourage people to break other windows and thereby
contends that if you allow minor crime to go unchecked, major crimes will follow. See
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety,

ATLANTIC,

Mar.

1982,

at

3-4,

available

at

http://www.theatlantic.com/

magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
3. A police "stop" occurs when an officer restricts the suspect's freedom of
movement and ability to terminate the encounter, but only temporarily and for purposes
of investigating potential crime. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth
Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 851, 852, 882 n.205 (2002) (describing a stop). A police "frisk" occurs when an officer
feels up the suspect or her effects, but only on the outside and in ways objectively designed
to find weapons. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (describing a frisk as "feel[ing]
with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body... [including] the groin and
area about the testicles..."); Cooper, supra, at 882 n.206. These forced seizures and
searches were approved by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 27 (1968)
(deciding the Fourth Amendment allows limited police seizures and searches of persons
upon reasonable suspicion rather than the traditional, and higher, probable cause
standard).
4. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal
dismissed, 770 F.3d 1051 (2014) (identifying disproportionate targeting of NYPD stops and
frisks); id. at 585-86 (rejecting arrest or crime rates as the proper measure of expected
stop ratios because the stopped population is overwhelmingly innocent).
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does not exist.5 Antibalkanization is exemplified by Justice Anthony
Kennedy's assumption that identity groups must be disbanded in
order to create racial equality. 6 Both those arguments are "out of
touch" with the reality that police officers continue to racially profile
young men of color.' The post-identity Justices are out of touch
because they assume that racial hierarchy is at or near its end even as
that idea is belied by the ongoing disproportionate policing of racial
minorities.8 Fortunately, there is a post-identity theory that holds
promise.
Preeminent legal scholar Martha Fineman's potentially better
post-identity approach, known as vulnerability theory, says that
people have a shared human condition of being susceptible to various
forms of harm and argues for state protection of substantive equality.9
5. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (announcing judgment and stating opinion as to colorblindness: "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race").
6. Justice Kennedy voices this antibalkanization rationale for his anti-affirmative
action stance in the Parents Involved and Ricci cases. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
557 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,delivering the opinion of the Court) (finding that a city's
discarding of a written qualification test on the grounds that the results prevented
promoting qualified black firefighters in a heavily black city violated the equal protection
rights of white and Latino firefighters who had performed highly on the written test);
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (-The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often
it does."); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 (2011) (arguing that
Justice Kennedy articulates an emerging antibalkanization approach). But see Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A
Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 3-7 (2015)
(documenting how antibalkanization rationale facilitates racial domination).
7. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1675 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Roberts' (in)famous call for colorblindness as "out
of touch").
8. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Continually Reminded of Their Inferior
Position": Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 J.L. & POL'Y 23,
101-05 (2014) (applying social dominance theory to unpunished acts of racial violence);
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race": The Inversion
of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
615, 654 & nn.256-57 (pointing to racial profiling as an example of "the Supreme Court
and several lower courts ...immuniz[ing] law enforcement practices that take race, along
with other factors, into account to burden persons of color in a way that replicates their
historical domination").
9. Vulnerability theory has sparked a rich and growing literature. See, e.g., Martha
Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to
Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1718-19 (2012) [hereinafter Fineman, Beyond Identities]
(arguing that the difference between the conception of equality in the United States of
America and the conception of equality in other democracies arises from differing
perceptions of human need and vulnerability); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism,
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"Vulnerability" is the concept that we are born unable to protect
ourselves, we become feeble with age, we must fear natural disasters,
and our social institutions might work against us.'0 For example, the
people of New Orleans suffered both from the natural disaster of
Hurricane Katrina and the social dysfunction of President George W.

Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619, 634-35 (2013) [hereinafter
Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities] (critiquing multidimensional masculinities theory for
considering particularized forms of identity); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9
(2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerable Subject] (emphasizing that embodiment creates
vulnerability); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive
State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 267-70 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive State]
(highlighting that vulnerability is a shared human condition). For further examples of
vulnerability theory, see generally VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013)
(collecting articles exploring vulnerability theory); Vulnerability and the Human Condition
Publications, EMORY U., http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/resources/Publications.html
(last visited Feb. 27,2015) (collecting resources regarding vulnerability theory).
Nancy Dowd has challenged vulnerability theory to account for race and gender by
showing how the case of black boys requires attention to interpersonal aggressions and
institutional hurdles that make them vulnerable in unique ways. See Nancy E. Dowd,
Unfinished Equality: The Case of Black Boys, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 36, 36 (2013)
[hereinafter Dowd, Unfinished Equality] (arguing for mixing vulnerability theory with
identities theories); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring
Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1051 (2012) (considering application of
vulnerability theory to fatherhood). Dowd also challenges vulnerability theory to
incorporate identities in an article on elder law. Nancy E. Dowd, Conceptualizing Elder
Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE NORMA ELDER LAW RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT:
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ELDER LAW 11, 11-15 (Ann Numhauser-Henning ed.,
2013).
Many others have entered the field of vulnerability theory. Kirsten Davis applies
vulnerability theory to family law. See Kirsten K. Davis, Extending the Vision: An
Empowerment Identity Approach to Work-Family Regulation as Applied to School
Involvement Leave Statutes, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 613, 619-20 (2010). Nina A.
Kohn has also written an insightful analysis of vulnerability theory. See Nina A. Kohn,
Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1,4-5 (2014)
(considering vulnerability theory's application to debates over equality and limited
government). Darren Rosenblum provocatively considers vulnerability theory in relation
to women's rights under international law. See Darren Rosenblum, Unisex Cedaw, or
What's Wrong with Women's Rights, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 140 (2011). Aziza
Ahmed has also applied vulnerability theory to international rights. See Aziza Ahmed,
Rugged Vaginas and Vulnerable Rectums: The Sexual Identity, Epidemiology, and Law of
the Global HIV Epidemic, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5-7 (2013). Osamudia James
recently considered vulnerability and race. See Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The
Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationaleon White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
425, 425-26 (2014). Even more recently, Michlle Alexandre uses vulnerability theory to
argue that certain areas of law and culture are stagnated by sexual profiling and
attachment to illusory gender-based distinctions. For her discussion on this topic, see
generally MICHtLLE ALEXANDRE, SEXPLOITATION: SEXUAL PROFILING AND THE
ILLUSION OF GENDER (2015).
10. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 9.
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theory thus argues that the government has an affirmative duty to
protect substantive equality of opportunity not only by preventing
vulnerability to natural disasters but also by correcting for social
hurdles rooted in cultural stereotypes. 2 Akin to colorblindness and

antibalkanization approaches, vulnerability theory contends that3
identity theory thwarts the effectiveness of politically progressive'
coalitions. 4 Unlike colorblind and antibalkanization approaches,
vulnerability theory acknowledges that our shared susceptibility to
physical and social harms makes people dependent on one another.'"
I think these principles of interdependency and affirmative

government duty are ones that people who disagree with racial
profiling can build upon.
Critics of racial profiling will have to revise vulnerability theory,
though, because its post-identity approach prevents it from addressing

police officers' differential treatment of men of color. Vulnerability
theory currently suggests that since law operates through
generalization, legal theorists should reject calls for specifying the

11. See Sheryll Cashin, Katrina: Tihe American Dilemma Redux, in AFTER THE
29,
29-37 (David Dante Troutt ed., 2006) (arguing that race played a role in FEMA's
response to Hurricane Katrina). For an interesting insight into the evacuation experience
of New Orleans natives, see Mitchell F. Crusto, Letters from a Native Son: Do You Know
What It Means to Miss New Orleans, in HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA'S UNNATURAL
DISASTER 23,23-34 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker eds., 2009).
12. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 638 (discussing need for
state to foster resiliency); see also Dowd, Unfinished Equality, supra note 9, at 36 (defining
vulnerability theory as placing affirmative duties upon state); Fineman, Beyond Identities,
supra note 9, at 1752 (arguing that state has responsibility to ameliorate injuries). Family
Law scholar Linda C. McClain also calls for using substantive equality as our means of
seeking a more progressive society. See Linda C. McClain, What's So Hard About Sex
Equality?: Nature, Culture, and Social Engineering, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES
OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 67, 82 (Martha Albertson
Fineman ed., 2011).
13. By "progressive," I mean the cluster of ideas centering on assumed
interdependence of individuals, willingness to regulate markets, comfort with strong
government, and generally seeking ever-increasing progress toward greater equality of
opportunity. By "conservative," I refer to a cluster of ideas centering around small
government, traditional social values, assumed individual autonomy and liberty, and
unregulated markets.
14. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 628 (suggesting that
identity theory has contributed to the destruction of political alliances and has impeded
the creation of effective coalitions).
15. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 11 (describing feminist model of
subjectivity "in which the liberal subject is enmeshed in a web of relationships
and ... dependent upon them").
STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA
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particular experiences of social groups.' 6 That cannot work because of
the reality that people have understood, 7 and will continue to
understand, themselves and others through the lens of identities. 8
Worse yet, vulnerability theory is susceptible to the argument that we
need more order-maintenance policing, not less. Police departments
could easily argue that racial minority overrepresentation in arrest
statistics should be reflected in race-based stops and frisks for the
greater good of protecting the most people from vulnerability to
crime. 9 Since vulnerability theory refuses to focus on race, gender,
and age identities, it would be unable to respond to such an argument
by showing how and why order-maintenance policing is facially
neutral but implicitly racially biased.2" The ultimate problem with
vulnerability theory is that while, unlike colorblindness and
antibalkanization approaches, it does not deny the existence of racial
hierarchy, it still proposes a solution that ignores race.
A revised vulnerability approach would keep what is most
beneficial in vulnerability theory, the concepts of people's
interdependence and the necessity of a strong state, but would add
the element of recognizing relative privilege. A privilege is "a special
advantage, immunity, permission, right, or benefit granted to or
16. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 620-26.
17.

See generally RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE

AMERICA (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (teaching about race and law with
substantial attention to historical construction of legal meanings of blacks, Native
American, Latina/o, Asian, and white identities).
18. On ongoing prejudice, see, for example, MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G.
GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE, at xii (2013) (describing

how implicit bias continues and affects behavior); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba
Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 119 (2014) (connecting

implicit bias and masculinity threat to violence).
19. In fact, former Republican New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg made just
such an argument following Judge Scheindlin's Floyd decision. Michael R. Bloomberg,
"Stop

and

Frisk"

Keeps

New

York

Safe,

WASH.

POST

(Aug.

18,

2013),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-keeps-newyork-safe/2013/08/18/8d4cd8c4-06cf-I 1e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html; see also HEATHER

MAC DONALD, ARE COPS RACIST? 28-34 (2003) (arguing there is no systematic racial
profiling because racially disparate arrest rates (assumed to be legitimate) justify racially
disparate suspicion). But see ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW
POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 10-11 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds.,

2001) (collecting articles critiquing rationales for order-maintenance policing in New York
City). Scholars have shown that the empirical support for race as an indicator of
suspiciousness is lacking. For an example, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens
Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006).
20. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Race, Vagueness,
and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

775, 790 (1999) (arguing order-maintenance policing is inherently racially biased).
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enjoyed by an individual, class, or caste. ' ' 21 Privilege makes the harms
of police targeting invisible to those who do not to fit the profile. I
suggest thinking of a privilege as an unearned benefit that has already
been conferred on you by the invisible operation of social norms and
will continue to operate to your benefit unless you affirmatively
disgorge the privilege. The theory of privilege shows that whiteness,
maleness, heterosexuality, and other privileged statuses are the
unacknowledged norms for how society is structured. 22 Because of the
way those norms interact in social practices, the status of being young,
male, and of color makes one vulnerable to racial profiling. While
vulnerability theory helps us challenge the state to address the harm
of racial profiling, the theory of privilege is necessary to understand
why elites allow racial profiling to continue. I thus argue for revising
vulnerability theory such that it acknowledges the ways identities and
privileges influence social practices.
Part I of this Article defines the problem by reviewing Floyd v.
City of New York 23 and its holding that the NYPD unconstitutionally
racially profiled young black and Latino men 24 and traces that
disparate treatment to the NYPD's order-maintenance approach to
policing. Part II explicates vulnerability theory, especially its reasons
for a post-identity approach. It describes the elements of
vulnerability-its
universality,
constancy,
complexity,
and
particularity-as well as its implications: that the state must foster
people's resilience by continually reviewing its institutions to ensure
21.

STEPHANIE

M.

WILDMAN,

PRIVILEGE

REVEALED:

How

INVISIBLE

PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996) (citation onitted), quoted in Danielle
Kie Hart, Revealing Privilege-Why Bother?, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 131, 134 (2013).
The source of this topic is Peggy McIntosh's work, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A
Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies
(Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988) (coining the
term "white privilege"). For examples of this concept's use, see Phoebe A. Haddon, Has
the Roberts Court Plurality's Colorblind Rhetoric Finally Broken Brown's Promise?, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court has "wrongly
embraced a colorblind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause"); Catherine Smith,
Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 383 (discussing privilege in the area of
heterosexual and homosexual relationships); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege, Gender,
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Reclaiming Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 707, 710 (2004) (discussing the concept of systemic privilege as it
relates to the Fourteenth Amendment); Mara Shulman Ryan, Note, Invisible in the
Courtroom Too: Modifying the Law of Selective Enforcement to Account for White
Privilege, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 302 (2012) (arguing that white privilege and
racism impacted a criminal investigation and prosecution).
22. See Hart, supra note 21, at 134-35 (discussing invisibility of hierarchized binary
statuses of privilege and disadvantage).
23. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
24. Id. at 562 (noting demographics of stops).
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that they foster equality of opportunity. Part III finds fault with
aspects of vulnerability theory. Specifically, it contends that a
universal perspective is impossible and that identities, while socially
constructed, are materially crucial. Part IV proposes a better model
for progressive scholarship by infusing vulnerability theory with
acknowledgement of the relative privileges that identity statuses
create. This Part more thoroughly illustrates the theory of privilege
and suggests what a post-privilege vulnerability theory would look
like. Part V briefly concludes.
I. THE PROBLEM: ONGOING RACIAL PROFILING

Racial profiling is an ongoing problem rooted in legal and social
ideologies. The legal ideology is the idea that police ought to have
wide discretion. We see this in the low threshold of justification for
Terry v. Ohio25 stop and frisks. We also see this in the pretext
doctrine's refusal to consider even admittedly racially prejudiced
policing to be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.2 6
The social roots of racial profiling are explicit and implicit bias
against racial minorities, as exacerbated by acceptance of certain
policing methodologies. First, many police officers explicitly use
arrest statistics to justify a belief that racial minorities are more crime
prone. Second, pervasive and deep-seated implicit bias against racial
minorities means that racial minorities tend to look more suspicious
even when engaged in the same behaviors as racial majorities. Third,
the "order-maintenance" policing methodology of aggressively
policing minor offenses, particularly in certain neighborhoods, results
in racially disparate policing.27 Order-maintenance policing was
influential nationwide, so it is unsurprising that the racial disparities
found in the Floyd case are typical. 8

25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
Amendment's reasonableness analysis precludes
intentions, thereby destroying defendant's Fourth
that undercover vice officers targeted two young
regulations).
27. See generally Kelling & Wilson, supra note

806, 813 (1996) (concluding Fourth
considering police officers' subjective
Amendment challenge despite the fact
black men in violation of local police
2 (propounding the theory).

28. See, e.g., ACLU, BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010, at 5-10 (2014), available at

https://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/images/education/stopandfrisk/black-brownand -targeted
_online.pdf (Boston); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435--36 (2005) (Seattle); ACLU
Takes Battle to End Racial Profiling to the Turnpike, ACLU (Oct. 4, 2001),
https://www.aclu.oirg/racial-justice/aclu-takes-battle-end-racial-pri-ofiling-turnpike (New Jersey).

1348

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

In section A of this Part of the Article, I trace the roots of racial
profiling to excessive legal discretion afforded to police officers,
implicit bias, and the order-maintenance approach. In Part B, I review
the Floyd decision as a means of demonstrating that we need a
theoretical approach to law and culture that addresses racial profiling.
A.

The Legal and Social Underpinningsof Racial Profiling

By now, the legal and social underpinnings of widespread racial
profiling are relatively clear. The power of police to racially profile is
created by the incredible discretion afforded them by federal criminal
procedure doctrine.2 9 Officers often may conduct intermediate
seizures and searches of suspects upon merely articulating suspicion

of crime or the presence of weapons that amounts to little more than
a hunch.3" This power derives from the decisions in the Camara v.
Municipal Court31 and Terry cases. In Camara, the Supreme Court

implicitly overturned the then-assumed rule that if an intrusion
constituted a "seizure" or "search" under the Fourth Amendment, it
had to be supported by probable cause.32 Such an assumption makes
sense, given that the Fourth Amendment specifies that warrants preauthorizing a search must be based upon probable cause.33 However,
the Camara Court held that the Amendment's earlier statement of a
prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures could govern

intrusions made for regulatory purposes rather than law enforcement

29. See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of
Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 Miss.
L.J. 341,392-93 (2004) (arguing that citizens are made more vulnerable to police discretion
by an "Iron Triangle" of cases preventing considering police officer's subjective intentions
during searches incident to arrest during vehicle searches).
30. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-32 (1990) (holding that a "totality of the
circumstances" approach was the correct way to assess reasonable suspicion); see, e.g.,
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (concluding that running at sight of police in
a high-crime neighborhood can give rise to reasonable suspicion).
31. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
32. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529, 534 (1967) (issuing landlord writ of
prohibition preventing warrantless apartment search and characterizing Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), as warrant-probable cause "exception"). On this implicit
rule, see Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters:Terry's "Seesaw Effect", 56 OKLA.
L. REV. 833, 852 (2003) (suggesting there was a pre-Terry understanding that probable
cause is required for a search or seizure).
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." (emphasis added)).
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purposes.' 4 Thus, the validity of a search under a municipal code
requiring proper trash collection or working fire extinguishers is
judged under a flexible "reasonableness" standard. 5
The lower threshold of justification for regulatory searches in
Camara set the stage for a sea change the following year in Terry.
Well before the Camaraand Terry cases, police had been doing "field
interrogations" in which they "stopped" suspicious persons and
"frisked" them for weapons despite lacking probable cause to arrest
or search those civilians. 36 Legal scholar John Q. Barrett reveals that
stops and frisks were created in order to control Italians in New York
City in the early 1900s, which may itself have been a form of racial
profiling.37 These stops and frisks were basically outside the usual
federal constitutional rules, as police often argued they were not
"searches" and state courts sometimes allowed them on less than the
usual probable cause standard. 8 The Terry Court split the proverbial
baby by applying Camara's reasonableness analysis rather than
requiring probable cause.39 As I have argued elsewhere, the Terry
Court created a "scope continuum" approach to the Fourth
Amendment by saying that the fact that stops and frisks were less
intrusive than arrests and "full blown" searches meant they could be
allowed upon a showing of an intermediate level of justification.'4
What would come to be known as "reasonable suspicion" justifies a
stop or frisk, whereas no justification is required to conduct a
nonseizure or nonsearch and probable cause is required to conduct an
arrest or full blown search.4 The only limit on stops and frisks is that

34. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. See generally Cooper, supra note 3, at 852-56 (arguing
that Camara limited the application of the "reasonableness" balancing approach).
35. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 852 (explicating Camara case).
36. See, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NO. 147374, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 39-40 (1967).
37. See John Q. Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of
Police Stops and Frisks Based on Less Than Probable Cause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT LEADING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 295,299-300

(Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (noting early usage of stops and frisks). See generally
JENNIFER GUGLIELMO & SALVATORE SALERNO, ARE ITALIANS WHITE?: How RACE IS

MADE IN AMERICA (2003) (analyzing treatment of Italians as a nonwhite race).
38. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (describing then-existing legal landscape
for stops and frisks).
39. See id. at 30.
40. Frank Rudy Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect" from Racial Profiling to Depolicing:
Toward a Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH 139, 142-43
(Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006).
41.

See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT § 9.4(e) (5th ed. 2012) (distinguishing stop and frisk from arrest and full
blown search).
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the officer must assert "specific and articulable" facts amounting to
more than a "hunch."42 This low reasonable suspicion threshold
makes it easy for police officers to conduct searches and seizures on
civilians when they do not have much basis for the intrusion. For
example, if the police officer has more than a hunch as a basis for
stopping someone, she will usually be able to frisk the suspect, which
includes careful exploration of the "groin. 4' 3 If the police officer then
"plain feels" a marijuana cigarette or unlicensed gun, she may arrest
that suspect. 44 So, one way police officers have excessive discretion is
that they only need a little more than a hunch in order to seize and
search civilians.
The pretext doctrine is another source of excessive police officer
discretion. The pretext doctrine says that when police officers
objectively have probable cause to arrest or fully search someone, it is
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that the
police officers were actually using the objective justification as a
pretext for a seizure or search they could not justify. Hence, in Whren
v. United States,45 the Supreme Court held that whenever a police
officer objectively has a "fair probability" that crime is afoot, any
actual racist reason for arresting or fully searching someone is
insulated from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 46 Elsewhere, the Court
has held that probable cause may be established by a mere one in
three chance.47 Moreover, if a police officer may arrest someone, she
may also fully search them incident to arrest without any further
justification. 8 In practice, then, an officer's pure hunch of a drug
crime, in conjunction with a less than fifty percent chance of any petty
crime, such as jaywalking, may become an excuse for an arrest and
full blown search. 49 The pretext doctrine is thus a second important
source of excessive police officer discretion.

42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
43. Id. at 17 n.13.
44. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771-72 (1983) (defining police officer
seeing an object immediately identifiable as evidence of crime as non-search under Fourth
Amendment).
45. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
46. See id. at 813.
47. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003) (holding probable cause
established on theories that one of three suspects or all three in concert possessed drugs in
a car); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214, 246 (1983) (creating "totality of circumstances"
approach to probable cause).
48. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that, during a
search incident to arrest, an officer's subjective rationales for the search are irrelevant).
49. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,354 (2001).
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Given implicit bias against racial minorities in society at large
and explicit belief among police officers in particular that minorities
are more likely to be criminals,5 1 it should not be a surprise that
officers most often use their wide discretion to target racial
minorities.52 Indeed, studies show that everyone has implicit biases
against socially stigmatized groups. 53 These biases are generally
stronger among normative groups, but deriving from history and
culture, they are pervasive. 4 For our purposes, it suffices to say that
widespread implicit bias has been scientifically proven.
Further research shows that implicit bias against racial minorities
is at least as strong, if not stronger, among police officers.
Notwithstanding the fact that police officer bias in targeting could
produce racially disparate arrest statistics, officers often use arrest
statistics to justify targeting racial minorities. Sociologist and legal
scholar Bernard Harcourt has criticized the "ratchet effect" created
by targeting people of color for arrest, then rationalizing further
targeting of racial minorities based on the racial disparate arrest
statistics that the targeting itself produces. 6 Legal scholar L. Song
Richardson has pointed out that police officers' insistence on racial
profiling is irrational. She cites many jurisdictions where the "hit
rates" for finding evidence of crime on suspects are much lower for
racial minorities than for whites. 5 s For Richardson, the over targeting
of racial minorities is the result of conscious racial profiling
magnifying implicit biases.59 It should be no surprise that a legal
landscape that provides excessive discretion to police officers,

50. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1108-10 (2006) (arguing for
debiasing method of confronting broad societal bias).
51. See Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement?
The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing,17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 419,
419-20 (2011) (noting consensus that police have traditionally targeted racial minorities).
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See generally BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 18 (summarizing the research
on implicit bias and showing that everyone has implicit biases against socially stigmatized
groups).
54. See generally id. (discussing nature and source of implicit bias).
55. See generally id. (detailing the social science methodology that has revealed
implicit bias).

To

take an implicit

bias test, see

Overview, PROJECT

IMPLICIT,

https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
56.

See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,

AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 145-72 (2007) (discussing police officer use of

arrest statistics to justify targeting racial minorities).
57. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035, 2035-37 (2011).
58. Id. at 2037-38.
59. Id. at 2039-40.
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coupled with a culture where implicit bias against racial minorities is
rampant, leads to racial targeting.
Since about 2000, the police methodology of order-maintenance
policing has exacerbated the legal and cultural factors leading to
racial profiling. Scholars have linked the dramatic racial disparities in
stop and frisk statistics to order-maintenance policing.6° Ordermaintenance policing is based on a theory thatpolice officers must
prevent the appearance of disorder. 6' For reasons of implicit bias,
racial minority communities are disproportionately perceived as
disordered.6 2 Accordingly, they will continue to be targeted and
patrolled at a higher rate. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy: the
perception of a disordered community justifies excessive police
officer targeting of its residents, with those arrest statistics then being
used to justify further scrutiny.63
Legal scholar K. Babe Howell ties together the legal, social, and
police methodology elements of racial profiling in her article, Broken
Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive OrderMaintenance Policing.64 As Howell poignantly shows, the overall
impact of racial profiling of young men of color is to create a distinct
justice system for young men of color:
When police stop suburban kids and find marijuana, they throw
away the drugs and speak to their parents. On the rare
occasions when suburbanites or wealthy people are arrested for
minor offenses, they hire attorneys, point to their clean records,
and refuse to accept a disposition short of dismissal.
On the other hand, people who live in New York City's
communities of color are subjected to [zero tolerance
policing].6"
Howell's assessment of the way order-maintenance policing imposes
differential costs should lead us to challenge this form of racial

60. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 2, at 477.
61. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 2, at 1.
62. L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment,
44 ARIZ. ST. L. 267, 268 (2012).
63. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 365 (1998).
64. See generally Howell, supra note 2 (providing her discussion of legal, social, and
police methodology elements).
65. K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows
Policing and the Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 439,442 (2010).
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profiling. Such a challenge was undertaken in litigation culminating in
Judge Scheindlin's Floyd v. City of New York decision.
B.

Floyd v. City of New York

In light of widespread racial profiling nationwide, the Floyd
court's decision to ban NYPD racial profiling stands as a potential
watershed moment. In sum, Judge Scheindlin found, sitting as trier of
fact, that the NYPD had a policy and practice of aggressively Terrystopping and frisking "the right people."6 6 The result of the NYPD's
practice was 4.4 million stops between 2004-2012.67 Of those stops,
fifty-two percent were of blacks, who constituted twenty-three
percent of the New York City population. 68 Meanwhile, thirty-one
percent of stops were of Latinas/os, who were twenty-nine percent of
the population.69 Somehow, though, only ten percent of stops were of
whites, who amounted to fully thirty-three percent of the
population.7 ° Despite this practice, there was a statistically significant
lower chance of finding evidence of crime on racial minorities. 7 It is
thus hard to explain the racial disparities in whom the NYPD
targeted. Worse yet, police used more force on racial minorities.72
Based on expert testimony, Judge Scheindlin determined that these
disparities could not be explained by any racial disparities in arrest or
crime rates.73 Finally, and alarmingly, Judge Scheindlin found as a fact
and conclusion of law that "at least 200,000" of the stops were
74
unconstitutional.
Clinical law professor Nicole Smith Futrell has pointed out two
especially telling statements about NYPD's racial profiling effects on
New York City's racial minorities.75 First, one stop and frisk victim
said, "When you're young and you're black, no matter how you look,

66. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
67. Id. at 558.
68. Id. at 559.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 559-60.
72. Id. at 560.
73. Id. ("The City and its highest officials believe that blacks and Hispanics should be
stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect population. But
this reasoning is flawed because the stopped population is overwhelmingly innocent-not
criminal. There is no basis for assuming that an innocent population shares the same
characteristics as the criminal suspect population in the same area.").
74. Id. at 559.
75. See generally Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless: Outsider Narrative
in Advocacy Against Discriminatory Policing, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2015) (using
narratives of African American men to highlight NYPD's stop and frisk racial profiling).
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you fit the description."76 This statement, which is supported by the
Floyd statistics, illustrates police officer feelings that their reason for
stopping racial minority suspects did not matter. Second, at the Floyd
bench trial, stop and frisk victim Tyquan Brehon testified that "I have
been taken in a lot of times because if you are stopping me I am
gonna want to know why and that is when you hear a change in their
tone."77 Here, we see that police felt they could act with immunity to
challenge and essentially arrest people for "contempt of cop."78
The Floyd decision is so interesting because it uses the equal
protection doctrine to strike down racial profiling. Until this opinion,
the equal protection doctrine had been seen as an inadequate means
of remedying racial profiling.79 Nonetheless, Judge Scheindlin struck
down the NYPD's racial profiling as a facial violation of the equal
protection doctrine based on the policy of stopping "the right
people." 80 She also struck down the policy in the alternative on
grounds that, if deemed facially neutral, the discriminatory purpose of
the program could be inferred from the starkness of the racial
81
disparities in stops as well as rates of discovering evidence of crime.
C.

Where Are We Now?

In the wake of the election of Mayor Bill de Blasio, New York
City dropped its appeal of Judge Scheindlin's opinion.82 Part of the
cost of that decision, though, has been police officer resentment of the
Mayor.83 On multiple occasions recently, large numbers of NYPD
officers have physically turned their backs on Mayor de Blasio as he

76. Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: "For Being a F**king Mutt",

NATION (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170413/stopped-and-friskedbeing-fking-mutt-video (video).
77. Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, The Scars of Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (June

12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000001601732/the-scars-of-stop-andfrisk.html (video).
78. "Contempt of Cop" is a means of describing situations where police officers
punish civilians for disrespecting them. Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism
and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV.
L.J. 1, 15 (2010).
79. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333-34 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding stop of
all young black males in town upon description of suspect as black).
80. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540,663 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

81. Id. at 662.
82. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits
on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31

/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0.
83. See Adam Klasfeld, Stop-and-Frisk Reform Talks Will Include NYC Cop Unions,

COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.courthousenews.com/
2015/03/19/stop-and-frisk-reform-talks-will-include-nyc-cop-unions.htm.
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gave speeches.' 4 This suggests that police disrespect for civilian review
of their practices is at very high levels. Meanwhile, the racial profiling
identified in New York City has been discovered elsewhere as well.
For example, the New Jersey ACLU and the Massachusetts ACLU
have issued reports on stop and frisk suggesting the problem is
pervasive.85 Our present condition of hyper-policing of men of color
raises this question: what perspective can deliver us from this
predicament?
II. WHAT IS VULNERABILITY THEORY?

Based on her perception that identity-based theories are
inadequate,8 6 Fineman proposes that we base a progressive theory on
the universal human condition of vulnerability. Her model for
vulnerability theory boils down to a desire to see everyone as sharing
a universal human condition and a call for the state to take greater
responsibility for arranging institutions such that they will prevent
and ameliorate injuries.87 Despite generally agreeing that the state
must take greater responsibility for providing people with the
resources they need to flourish, identities theorists have several
reasons to be worried about vulnerability theory's post-identity
approach. I discuss those concerns in the next Part of the Article.
My goal in this Part is to be fair to vulnerability theory before
critiquing it. This Part will proceed as follows. Section A explicates
some essential ingredients of vulnerability theory. Section B discusses
implications of the theory for methodology and governance.
A.

The Elements of Vulnerability

Vulnerability theory is built upon "the realization that many
[physically or psychologically harmful] events are ultimately beyond
human control."88 For example, we are far from capable of preventing
weather disasters, such as hurricanes. Similarly, the social world can
make people vulnerable. For instance, the administration of the
second President Bush was widely criticized for its response to
84. See Rebecca Kaplan, NYPD Chief: "Inappropriate"for Officers to Turn Backs on
Mayor Again, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nypdchief-bratton-inappropriate-for-officers-to-turn-backs-on-mayor-again/ (discussing officers
turning their backs on the Mayor in the wake of the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric
Garner).
85. ACLU, supra note 28, at 1.
86. See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 254 n.11 (declaring "insufficiency
of identity-focused equality").
87. Id. at 269.
88. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 9.
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Hurricane Katrina.89 Further, vulnerability is the possibility of injury
to both oneself and one's relationships. The relationships that are
injured could be between two individuals, such as between a father
and son, or between institutions of the state and the individual or
groups of individuals. As an example of how the relationship between
institutions and groups can itself be broken and injurious to
individuals, consider the fact that black and Latino boys (as well as
less-lauded Asians such as Cambodians) are disproportionately
doubted academically and suspended.' According to vulnerability
theory, these examples show that we are all constantly subject to
injury to the self and to our relationships.
Vulnerability theory goes beyond the harms that occur to
individuals and makes social institutions themselves vulnerable.
According to Fineman, "institutions such as the family ... are unable
to eliminate individual vulnerability and are themselves vulnerable
structures susceptible to harm and change."'" Institutions like the
family are vulnerable in that families are recognized by the state and
may be supported or harmed by its laws, such as through tax
benefits.92 So, vulnerability is personal, relational, and institutional, all
at once.
Vulnerability is also co-constituted by all three of those aspects. 93
Hence,
individuals influence relationships and institutions,
relationships influence individuals and institutions, and institutions
influence individuals and relationships. None of these aspects is
completely separate from the other. We thus see vulnerability cutting

89. See generally AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE
MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 11 (collecting articles on fallout from
Hurricane Katrina); MITCHELL F. CRUSTO, LIBERTY: How CRISIS DEFINES OUR RIGHTS

(forthcoming Carolina Academic Press, 2015) (using
constitutional principles).

Katrina stories to illustrate

90. See PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS: AND OTHER
REFLECTIONS ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, at xxi

(2008) (summarizing negative stereotypes about and treatment of black boys in schools);
see also Dowd, Unfinished Equality, supra note 9, at 51 (citing Tyrone C. Howard, Who
Really Cares? The Disenfranchisement of African American Males in PreK-12 Schools: A
Critical Race Theory Perspective, 110 TCHR. C. REC. 954, 974 (2008)) (citing research on
low expectations and over-punishment of black boys).
91. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 11.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (holding that a
lesbian spouse could not be denied tax benefits under the Defense of Marriage Act).
93. "Co-constituted" means that two or more institutions, identities, etc., are
reciprocally influencing one another. See Frank Rudy Cooper, We Are Always Already
Imprisoned: Hyper-Incarceration and Black Male Identity Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV.
1185,1195 (2013).
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through all of those aspects of life and must ask, what are the
elements of vulnerability itself?
In her article, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,
Fineman identifies four key elements of vulnerability: universality,
constancy, complexity, and particularity.9 4 The universality aspect of
Fineman's definition is based upon her seeing everyone as having the
shared condition of being vulnerable. She says the following of the
term "vulnerability": "[M]y work has developed the concept of
vulnerable detached from specific subgroups, using it to define the
'
very meaning of what it means to be human."95
The key to
vulnerability theory, then, is that it conceives of vulnerability as a
universal part of the human condition. While Fineman does not claim
that vulnerability is the foundation of "what it means to be human," it
seems clear from her language that it is important to her that
vulnerability be understood as shared by all.96
A necessary assumption of universality as conceptualized in
vulnerability theory is the idea that we can establish universals in the
first place. Many would say that there is no "view from nowhere" that
would allow us to understand "what it means to be human" under all
circumstances. 97 Fineman would say that, to the extent it is impossible
to create a universal, we must construct one anyways because we are
dealing with law. This is implied by her claim that "[w]hen we deal
with the law.., we employ a system dependent on the process of
classification, generalization, and universal applicability."' 98 For
Fineman, this means "the most important task for those interested in
a social justice project ... is to construct a legal subject with which to
replace the abstract liberal subject with its accompanying and
unrealistic
constructs
of
autonomy,
self-sufficiency,
and
independence." 99 Those references to "universal applicability" and
the "abstract liberal subject" demonstrate that vulnerability theory
seeks to construct a universal subject. Since "the subject" is the
thinker in the Cartesian model of "I think, therefore I am," and
subjectivity is "one's awareness of oneself as a subject in the world,"
vulnerability theory's claim that there is a universal subject is a

94.

Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268.

95. Id. at 266.
96. Id.
97. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (challenging

ability to have purely objective perspective).
98. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities,supra note 9, at 619-20.
99. Id. at 620.
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significant assertion about personhood.1°° As a claim about
subjectivity, vulnerability theory is an attempt to create a vantage
point from which we can see everyone as similar enough that we feel
bound to one another. If we agreed that we are all vulnerable, maybe
we could agree that we need a strong state to help us prevent injuries
and recover from those that occur anyways.
In addition to the universality of vulnerability, a second
important aspect of vulnerability theory is the constancy of
dependency on others. Fineman joins feminist critiques of the liberal
subject's supposed autonomy by contending that "the liberal subject
is enmeshed in a web of relationships and.., dependent upon
them."'' Vulnerability should be "understood as a state of constant
possibility of harm" that "cannot be hidden."'0 2 Because vulnerability
is constant, we are unavoidably dependent on each other and on the
state. The element of constancy thus also sets up vulnerability
theory's argument for a strong state.
The third prong of vulnerability theory is complexity.
Vulnerability is complex because "it can manifest itself in multiple
forms."' 013 We could suffer simple physical harm, but that physical
harm could itself create harms to our relationships.' ° Those
relationships could be with other people or with institutions. 5 That
second-level harm to relationships with others or with institutions
could be economic or it could be social."° Moreover, physical or other
injuries to the individual could also result in intergenerational transfer
of the consequences of injuries. As Fineman notes, the United States
of America has among the very lowest rates of movement from the
lower- to middle-classes of Western industrial nations. 07 The reason
for the calcification of social statuses relates to the way social
groupings work in our society:
[N]egative economic and institutional harms may cluster
around members of a socially or culturally determined grouping
who share certain societal positions or have suffered
discrimination based on constructed categories used to
100. See Thomas A. King, A Few Thoughts About "Subjectivity," MAPPING BRANDEIS
PROJECT (Mar. 27, 2006), http://people.biandeis.edu/-mappingbandeis/subjectivity.htnml
(defining terms).
101. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 11.
102. Id.
103. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268.
104. See id. (describing complexity of injuries).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 268 n.57 (describing lack of intergenerational mobility).
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differentiate classes of persons, such as race, gender, ethnicity,
or religious affiliation.' 8
For vulnerability theorists, then, the existence of social groups is part
of what makes the human condition complex. In turn, those social
groupings are an additional source of vulnerability. The element of
complexity is in tension with vulnerability theory's post-identity
approach, however, because it acknowledges that identities help
create vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability theory's final element, the particularity of the
human condition, is meant to explain complexity without reference to
identities. According to vulnerability theory, we differ in our
"embodiment" and in our social location "within webs of economic
and institutional relationships."'" Having a different phenotype or a
different social status changes how we are treated. Thus, variation
among humans means that we have particular experiences of
vulnerability. "0
The first way in which particularity affects vulnerability is in
embodied differences. That is, we are particularized by
"physical/mental/intellectual and other variations .... ."" Fineman
acknowledges that such variations "are not socially neutral, and
historical reaction to some human variations, particularly race and
gender, has led to the creation of hierarchies, discrimination, and
even violence.""' 2 So, identities did matter at one point. Fineman goes
on to insist, however, that continuing to use differences in
embodiment to define who is vulnerable "obscures the reality of
universal vulnerability" and "stigmatizes" those groups."' So, we
should respond to embodied particularity by emphasizing our
overarching shared human condition of vulnerability.
The second way that particularity affects vulnerability in
Fineman's analysis is through social location. She says that our
differential locations within relationships with other people and
institutions "structure our options and create opportunities."'" 4 Social
location is so important because institutions provide us with access to
resources for addressing our vulnerabilities."' Those resources might
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities,supra note 9, at 637.
Id.
Id.
ld. at 638.
Id.
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be child care or food or unemployment insurance. But if our
relationship to our family or local businesses or the government is
fractured, we cannot access those resources. Because social location is
key to acquisition of the resources to address vulnerabilities,
vulnerability theorists suggest that identities are not especially
important. Such a conception fits with Fineman's pervasive
description of phenomena that could be explained as rooted in
identities as instead rooted in institutional arrangements. 16
Vulnerability theory's goal in rejecting identities is laudable:
connecting vulnerability to a greater responsibility for society to
configure institutional arrangements so that they will prevent and
ameliorate injuries." 7 Again, then, vulnerability theory helps justify a
strong state.
Together, Fineman's elements of vulnerability theory describe a
universal human condition and how it varies. Overall, the elements
create a post-identity way of seeking social progress. What the
elements leave somewhat open is the means of accomplishing that
goal. In the next section, I will briefly describe the implications of
vulnerability theory as the means of seeking social progress.
B.

Implications of Vulnerability Theory

If we accept vulnerability theory, we are led to two principal
conclusions. First, it seems that vulnerability theory would have us
reject identities. In The Vulnerable Subject, Fineman explicitly claims
that the current understanding of suspect classifications under the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause "define[s]
individual legal identities.... .""IFineman also takes "[t]his system of
identity categories" to "define[] the organization of interest
groups.""' 9 Relating her theory that individuals are better defined as
positioned by systems of power than by identity theory's concept of
intersectionality, 20 Fineman states as follows:
116. See generally Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9 (calling for dumping

identities from equal protection analysis); Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9
(criticizing multidimensional masculinities theory).
117. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 639.

118. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 2-3.
119. Id. at3.
120. Intersectionality is the concept that when two or more categories of identity
intersect, the identity formed there is unique. So, the identity "black woman" is not
reducible to the addition of a lowest common denominator experience of women and
blacks in general. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243-44

(1991) (coining the term "intersectionality"); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (identifying essentialism in
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[W]ith respect to the assets any one person possesses, it is not
multiple identities that intersect to produce compounded
inequalities,. .. but rather systems of power and privilege that
interact to produce webs of advantages and disadvantages.
Thus,... a vulnerability analysis provides a means of
interrogating the institutional practices that produce the
identities and inequalities in the first place.' 2'
The heart of this quote is that systems of "power," by which Fineman
seems to mean wealth and control of institutions rather than
"privilege," as I use the term, position people more than systems of
identity do so.22 I see Fineman's contrasting of power and identities
as resting on two propositions. First, "systems of power" are distinct
from systems of identities. Preeminent feminist theorist Martha
Chamallas refers to vulnerability theory as part of a movement
toward "feminism without feminism" because of its post-identity
stance.' 3 In this sense, identities are simply irrelevant to the broader
progressive goal of making society less influenced by hierarchical
power relations. A second proposition is that systems of power affect
a person's resources for addressing vulnerabilities more than do
identities. Vulnerability theory thus prioritizes analysis of power over
analysis of identities. As I will discuss in the next Part of this Article, I
reject the propositions that identities are irrelevant or subsumed by
generalized analysis of power relations based on the fact that
identities are materially crucial.
The second key implication of vulnerability theory is that it is the
best way to justify a strong government (state). Vulnerability theory's
overall goal is to foster "resilience."' 2 4 Resilience is the ability to
bounce back from injury. 25 Vulnerability theory's primary method of
fostering resilience is to promote a responsive state. 6 A responsive

feminist legal theory). For more information on intersectionality, see generally CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003).
121. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 16 (citations omitted).

122. See id. Fineman is not using the word "privilege" in the way that I advocate, for
she does not cite its major explicators, Peggy McIntosh and Stephanie Wildman, nor the
related literature. See id.
123. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUcTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 137 (3d
ed. 2012); see also Marc Spindelman, Feminism Without Feminism, 9 ISSUES LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP, art. 8 (2011) (coining term).
124. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 269; Fineman, Vulnerable Subject,
supra note 9, at 13.
125. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 270.

126. Id. at 273-74 (explaining the responsiveness of state institutions is under suspicion
in American society for fear of interference with entrenched ideals of autonomy and
liberty).
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state provides and supports the institutions that help create resiliency
in the face of vulnerabilities.'27 It does so by continuously monitoring,
evaluating, updating, and reforming its institutions. The focus should

be on the state's responsibility to its citizens in assuring the equality
of opportunity, treatment, and access to resources that would allow
individuals to be resilient. 128 Such constant reevaluation of state
institutions to ensure equal opportunity and access is necessary
because institutions, like humans, are vulnerable to harm, here in the
form of corruption of institutions such that they do not provide
everyone with equality of opportunity. 129 For instance, the recent
Department of Justice report on the Ferguson, Missouri Police
Department demonstrates how institutions are vulnerable to
corruption. 130 Vulnerability theory's solution would seem to require
institutions to constantly monitor themselves and be externally
monitored to make sure they are fully serving all of the people. In
Ferguson, Missouri, vulnerability theory would help explain the need
for long-term federal monitoring.
Vulnerability theory's means of enforcing a responsive state is to
create an equal protection claim that requires the state to
affirmatively create equality of opportunity. This is a substantive
127.
128.
premise
burden

Id. at 274.
For instance, Fineman's version of equal protection doctrine starts from the
that the state must treat everyone equally as well unless the state carries its
of justification for a deviation. See MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 154-55

(1995); Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 2. She wants our constitutional and
statutory antidiscrimination laws to reach the "combined workings of the economic,
political, cultural, and social systems." Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1736
n.99. As Fineman acknowledges, the Fourteenth Amendment had the potential to
guarantee substantive equality. See id. at 1726. The fault for the demise of substantive
equality seems to lie at the feet of conservative politicians and judges going back to the
1970s (and earlier), though, not identities theorists. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (rejecting societal discrimination as a basis for affirmative action). For
example, political historian Jeremy Mayer reveals that political conservatives made
fighting racial progress the secret core of their agenda from Goldwater through Reagan.
See JEREMY D. MAYER, RUNNING ON RACE: RACIAL POLITICS IN PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS, 1960-2000, at 293 (2002). 1 would like to see Fineman more clearly

acknowledge that conservatives ruined equal protection doctrine, not identities theorists.
129. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1716 (contending that events such as
market fluctuations, changing international policies, institutional and political
compromises, and prejudices harm institutions and that those in control often hide
institutional vulnerabilities).
130. See generally, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF

(2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson-police-depar tment-.repor t
.pdf (criticizing Ferguson, Missouri Police Department for pattern and practice of racially
discriminatory policing).
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
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equality. In contrast, the current formal equality approach to equal
protection is based on an extreme version of the Lockean conception
of individuals as autonomous. 3 ' As to equality, conservative
jurisprudence guarantees only a negative right not to be treated
differently when the discrimination is explicitly based on specified
prohibited grounds.13 1 Substantive equality would start from the
premise that the state must treat everyone equally as well unless the
state carries its burden of justification for a deviation. 33 Borrowing
from Vermont's state constitutional jurisprudence, Fineman's version
of substantive equality would establish "a positive right to access the
social goods or resources necessary to sustain equally valued
individuals.' ' 134 Vulnerability theory's substantive equality approach
would thus reach the "combined workings of the economic, political,
cultural, and social systems.' ' 35 I am on board with vulnerability
theory's acknowledgement of everyone's interdependence and call for
a substantively responsive state but believe it will not fulfill its
promise unless it is responsive to the effects of identities. The next
Part more fully explains why I believe vulnerability theory must
grapple with identities.
III. CRITIQUING VULNERABILITY THEORY

My criticisms of vulnerability theory's rejection of identities
revolve around this insight: when it comes to men of color, we are
always already suspect. 136 Even if we accept vulnerability theory's
description of particularity as a matter of embodiment, men of color
are distinguishable from the universal human condition based on our
131. See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 2.
132. See, e.g., CRAVEN, supra note 128, at 154-55; Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra

note 9, at 2.
133. See CRAVEN, supra note 128, at 154-55; Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note

9, at 2.
134. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1718-19. Fineman particularly lauds

the Vermont doctrine requiring equal treatment, which she sees as requiring that social
success derives only from "differences of capacity, disposition, and virtue, rather than
governmental favor or privilege." Id. at 1729-30 (citations omitted). Vermont's doctrine
specifically prohibits "the conferral of advantages or emoluments upon the privileged." Id.
at 1730 (citations omitted). Fineman does not emphasize the wrongness of the status of
being privileged; she is most concerned with the wrongness of the state conferring benefits
on some but not others. See id. Because I see privilege as systematically conferred by
social norms, especially through understandings about the meanings of identities, my
emphasis is different.
135. Id. at 1736 n.99.
136.

See Louis ALTHUSSER, ON THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY

AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 265 (G.M. Goshgarian trans., 2014) (referring

to "always already" being subjected to, and made a subject by, ideology).
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racial phenotype and gender. The "historical reaction"' 37 to our
particular intersection of race and gender, which is different than
historical reactions to black women and white men, is an ongoing
social fact.'3 8 And, at least in the context of policing, it is significantly
worse than the reaction to other individuals.
In vulnerability theory's other way of describing particularity,
our social location is that of permanent outsider. We are not just
temporarily defined as culturally inferior and dangerous. As Fineman
acknowledges, "Individuals who have certain characteristics have
been subordinated and excluded from the benefits of society, often
because their differences are thought to indicate they are dangerous,
or interpreted as inadequacy, inferiority or weakness."' 3 9 In this
society, young, urban, black or Latino males are the symbol of
dangerousness beyond all others."4
Vulnerability theory does not work for analysis of racial profiling
because the always already suspect status of young black males is
unlikely to change in the near future. As Angela Harris has described,
because the United States of America has been founded upon the
subordination of blacks in general, there is an "African-American
exception[]" to the usual "melting ...pot" narrative that social
groups are quarantined for a while and then allowed into the
mainstream.'4 1 Harris contrasts the former negative treatment of
white ethnics with ongoing subordination of blacks under the rubric
of "black exceptionalism."' 42 I take the concept of black
exceptionalism to mean that progress for white ethnics, and even
Asians or Latinas/os, may not be extended to blacks. This conflicts
with Fineman's belief that neither privilege nor advantage is tied to
identities.'4 3 But identification of young men of color as suspicious is
so pervasive as to make identities, not a universalizable vulnerability,
137. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities,supra note 9, at 637.
138. See generally Cooper, supra note 1 (discussing uniqueness of black male attributed

identity).
139. Fineman, Feminism, Mascilinities,supra note 9, at 637.
140. See generally VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND

LATINO BOYS (2011) (studying police treatment of black and Latino boys in Oakland).
141. Cf Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-BabyLatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997)

(conversing about ways in which the black-white binary paradigm of race is productive
and unproductive). For an excellent festschrift on Angela Harris's work, see generally
Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: Trayvon Martin,
George Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1027
(2014).

142. Espinoza & Harris, supra note 141, at 1596.
143. See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 17.
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foundational to their subjectivity. 1" Because of racial profiling, young
black men are vulnerable in a special way. This fact presents a serious
challenge to vulnerability theory's insistence on a universal human
condition.
While I admire vulnerability theory's utopian, "people are
people" mentality, I fear that its universal approach masks real
differences amongst people. In section A, I argue that vulnerability
theory's universal approach hides the continuing existence of
particular experiences based on identities. In section B, I then discuss
how identities are merely socially constructed but remain materially
crucial. In section C, I briefly consider a potential objection to my
critique.
A.

UniversalsHide Particularity

Vulnerability theory necessarily assumes that there can be a
standard version of personhood 4 5 Based on the teaching of critical
theory, and especially critical race theory, I argue that there is no
universal that does not in fact hide an intrinsic particularity.'4 6 The
legal realists had already debunked the idea that law could be neutral
enough to describe a universal perspective.'47 Critical race theorists
further contend that the particularity that is smuggled back into the
universal is likely to be the same norms we traditionally have seen in
the West. For example, in the West, the "universal" perspective has
been based on the experiences and viewpoints most common to
straight, white, able-bodied Christian men who are economically
advantaged. 4 8 That means the universal description of the human
condition has really been a particularity making a claim to
universality. Accordingly, Iris Marion Young has described a "scaling

144. On the black-male-as-criminal stereotype, see, for example, Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2005) (summarizing research showing

black males associated with criminality); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of
Surphs Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" Was a "War on Blacks", 6 J. GENDER

RACE & JUST. 381, 381 n.1 (2002) (discussing how the drug war exploited and reinforced
stereotype of black criminality).
145. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 619-20 (referring to model's
"universal applicability").
146. See generally Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS

THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii-xxxii (Kimberl Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995)
(describing and extending Critical Legal Studies' critique of objectivity).
147. Gary Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599,

633-35 (1989) (summarizing uses of Legal Realism).
148. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 126-28

(1990) (describing Western epistemology as rooted in a "scaling of bodies"); Cooper,
supra note 1, at 870-73.
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of bodies" in Western culture whereby attributes are hierarchized.'4 9
Race is hierarchized as white over black, gender as male over female,
religion as Christian over "infidel," and so on. 5 ' Because the scaling
of bodies is built into Western culture, accepting Western culture's
invitation to generalize into a universal is likely to implicitly accept
the scaling of bodies.
The ultimate problem with universals is that we have a race, a
gender, a sexual orientation, and a class status whether we choose to
acknowledge all of those statuses or not.'' For instance, as Barbara
Flagg has pointed out, whites have tended to think of themselves as
having no racial identity. 5 ' Blacks, Asians, and Latinas/os have not
been afforded that luxury.'53 Moreover, whites do not actually lack
racial identity. Their whiteness is simply "transparent" in that the
experiences and viewpoints shared by most whites, or at least whites
in power, are presumed to be normal and norm-setting.'54 These white
norms thus serve as the background principles for reasonability and
objectivity. So, when we assume that "people are people," we end up
installing a particular group's experiences and worldview as an
objective vantage point. That is a crucial reason that we cannot
replace identities theory with an assumption of a universal
vulnerability.
Criminal procedure provides an example of the problem with
generalizing. Scholars in the field have long debated the utility of
generalizing and concluded that rigid, bright-line rules must bear a
strong resemblance to reality. For example, the search incident to
arrest rule says that police may search the area within the "immediate
control" of the suspect when they have probable cause to arrest
him. 5 The Court used to generalize this rule by presuming that the
passenger compartment of a car is within the immediate control of the

149. See supra note 148.

150. See

YOUNG,

supra note 148, at 126-28 (defining scaling of bodies).

151. See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 1 (1998) (defining "the [white] transparency phenomenon");
see also Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 977-78 (1993) (defining

"the [white] transparency phenomenon").
152. See Flagg, supra note 151, at 957.

153. See, e.g., Espinoza & Harris, supra note 141, at 1603-04 (discussing theory of black
exceptionalism).
154. See Flagg, supra note 151, at 970 (describing how whiteness becomes transparent).
155. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). I use "universal pronoun"
(male pronoun) because the vast majority of criminal suspects are men. If you noticed its
genderization, you may not be in favor of universals.
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suspect when he is stopped in a car.156 This rule reached its breaking
point when the Court acknowledged that police officers almost always
lock the arrestee in a police cruiser before conducting a search of his
car. 5"' 7 The Court thus moved away from its generalization and created
a new rule requiring that the suspect either actually have the
passenger compartment within his immediate control or be subjected
to a special exception.5 8 So generalization is not an inevitable rule of
legal method. Nor should it be a rule of subjectivity.
Vulnerability theory seems to acknowledge
that its
generalizations about the human condition will not always reflect
reality. Fineman admits that attempting to change law through her
vulnerability lens "may overlook some differences among people in
the interests of furthering reforms to benefit the larger group."' 15 9 I
ask: Whose interests will be overlooked? Who will choose the nature
of the common goals? Unfortunately, the minority's interests are the
ones that are usually overlooked and the majority is usually the group
that chooses the supposedly common goals.
B.

Identities Are Socially Constructed but Materially Crucial
Meanwhile, the problem with subsuming identities under
vulnerability theory's principles of complexity and particularity is that
we are not all vulnerable in the same ways or even to the same
degrees. To say that we are all united by vulnerability is to say that, at
rock bottom, we are all the same. That is true in an abstract sense but
not in reality. If all we had was what unites us, we could never identify
ourselves as unique and particular individuals. We are all human, but
we are different types of humans. The differentiation of humans into
social groupings provides us with a key, perhaps even inescapable,
way of coming to understand ourselves. I am not saying that we have
to identify ourselves solely based on race and gender body types.
Nonetheless, to say, "I am human" is to say very little when talking to
another human. To say, "I am from the United States of America" to
a nonresident of the United States, or, "I am a northerner" to
156. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981), overruled by Arizona v. Gant,

556 U.S. 332 (2009) (allowing per se search incident to arrest of passenger compartment of
car).

157. See Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: EmbracingJustice Scalia's Call for
the Supreme Court to Abandon an UnreasonableApproach to Fourth Amendment Search
and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 77, 110 (2007) (arguing for the approach to Belton

advocated by Justice Scalia in Thorton).
158. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (overturning Belton).
159. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities,supra note 9, at 634.
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someone from the southern United States, or, "I am black," or, "I am
male," or, "I am straight" to my interlocutor, assuming they cannot
tell that I am these things, starts to separate me from the mass of
humanity. While I cannot gainsay vulnerability's claim that law
operates through processes of classification and generalization," 6 I
wonder, do those generalizations not have to be roughly accurate?
Since it is inevitable that I must sometimes distinguish myself as from
the United States, the North, and so on, we ought to recognize that
fact by refusing to pretend that there is a universal human condition
that does not have to be differentiated in practice.
With this insight in mind, I want to return to the first implication
of vulnerability theory: its claim that "systems of power" subsume
identities. Vulnerability theory's propositions that systems of power
are distinct from identities and that they affect people more than
identities are nothing short of a rejection of the central insight of
critical race feminists. For us, the fundamental social system is that we
are born into a world that positions us within a web of categories of
identity. 6 ' Moreover, the intersection of categories of identities, such
as black and female, creates a unique identity that is not generalizable
to the lowest common denominator of the two categories.' 62 So, a
black woman should not have her interests lumped in with those of all
blacks, or all women, or all humans. As a consequence, both of
vulnerability theory's propositions about identities are wrong because
identities are co-constituted with, and thus inextricable from, systems
of power.
We can demonstrate another problem at the heart of
vulnerabilities theory by debunking its notion of identity formation.
For instance, Fineman claims that "institutional practices ...produce

the identities and inequalities in the first place." '63 At best, Fineman's
claim is only partially right. Identities and institutional practices are
co-constituted in that they reciprocally influence one another. 64 To
say that identities and institutional practices are co-constituted is to
160. See id. at 619-20 (defending universality).
161. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 7 (1998) (arguing black women's positionality affects their

subjectivity).
162. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER, supra note 120, at 1, 1-18 (discussing women of color's unique positionality).
163. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 16.
164. Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Introduction: Masculinities,
Multidimensionality, and Law: Why They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND THE
LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1, 11 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley
eds., 2012).
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say that they are imbricated in one another. People form their
identities based in part on their interactions with institutions, but at
the same time, institutions operate only through the actions of
individuals who themselves have pre-formed senses of the meanings
of their own and others' identities. That means that identity formation
precedes, but is also simultaneously influenced by, institutional
practices.
Moreover, identities are both unreal in that they are socially
constructed and also materially crucial. If all Fineman's critique
means is that we are all human, it would be hard to disagree with her.
That would imply that identities such as race are not "real," but
socially constructed. As a critical race theorist, I subscribe to the
theory of social construction. Identities are "formed" by social
conditions rather than derived directly from nature. 165 There is
nothing more to race than our interpretation of certain bodily
characteristics as constituting a "race," which we then take to connote
certain personality traits. It is nurture, not nature that creates
identities. 66 As a biological matter, there is no such thing as race: we
are all human. And this point has been made with respect to other
identities.'6 7 Vulnerability theory thus seems to suffer from what
critical
race
theorist
Kimberl6
Crenshaw
calls
"vulgar
constructionism. "168 This is the fallacy that because identities are not
69
real in the biological sense, we should not organize around them.'
The remaining problem is that, in the social world, identities are
very much real. That is, identities are socially constructed but
materially consequential. 70 For example, pretending I am human and
not a black male could get me shot by the police. Numerous sources
have reported about the tradition of black parents warning their black
boys not to try to seek equal treatment from the police, lest they be
shot. 7' The "don't get yourself shot" talk that parents must have with
165.

MICHAEL OMI

&

HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED

STATES 105-15 (3d ed. 2015) (explicating racial formation theory).
166. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 12 (1999) (classically stating that "there is no recourse to a

body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings").
167. Judith Butler, Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism, in
CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE

LEFT 11, 29 (Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau & Slavoj Ziek eds., 2000).
168. Crenshaw, supra note 120, at 386 n.75 (defining vulgar constructionism).
169. Id.
170. Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and Obama's
Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633,643 (2009).
171. See James H. Burnett I1, After Trayvon Martin, It's Time for "The Talk,"
BOSTON.COM

(Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/Iocal/massachusetts/articles/
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black boys is a powerful symbol of the material consequences of
identities.
As a matter of biology, we are all human, but as a matter of our
social lives, we have identities. If vulnerability theory is suggesting
that just because identities are socially constructed, we can get outside
of them, it is mistaken. Accordingly, vulnerability theory is wrong
when it implicitly suggests that the constructedness of identities
makes them unimportant in relation to our shared human condition
of being vulnerable. In sum, identities continue to matter and they are
not sufficiently recognized in vulnerability theory as presently
constructed.
C. Reconsidering Elements of Vulnerability Theory
This section applies the critiques of vulnerability theory as
creating a false universal and neglecting the material consequences of
identities by reconsidering Fineman's four elements of the theory.
The subsections thus review vulnerability theory's principles of
universality, constancy, complexity, and particularity. The last
subsection argues there is an element missing from vulnerability
theory: privilege.
1. Universality
Law may be "dependent on the process of classification,
generalization, and universal applicability," but that dependence has
always been false and, accordingly, our imagination of a better world
should not be limited to universals.17 As I discussed in Part III.A of
this Article, the critical race theory movement has debunked the idea
that there can be an objective and universal perspective. Given that
fact, law's call for universality should not be answered. We should not
set up false equivalences between all types of people. Black men are
always already suspect, which is simply different than being a white
male who encounters the police. Consequently, we should revise
universality out of vulnerability theory.
Having said universality is impossible, I believe that we are all
vulnerable and that this theory does the best job of elaborating the
ways that is so. The key is that vulnerability reveals our
interdependence and thus provides a reason for coalition-building.

2012/04/07/in-ligh tofjtrayvon-martin-caseblackfathers-in_boston-are-scrambling-to_
havesafety-talk-with-sons/ (discussing ritual of parents telling black boys that police may
shoot them).
172. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 619-20.

2015]

ALWAYS ALREADY SUSPECT

1371

While there is a shared human condition of being vulnerable,
however, people remain differentially privileged. We should not refer
to one universal human condition but to the fact that people are
universally vulnerable.
2. Constancy
Recognizing the constancy of vulnerability seems much less
problematic than referring to a singular human condition. While we
are not all the same, our shared condition of vulnerability does
provide a basis for solidarity. Since we cannot escape our inevitable
dependency, we might as well band together to fight for a strong
state. The exemplary illustration of privilege that I will relate in Part
IV.A will help demonstrate what we already know: The privileged
and the disadvantaged are both harmed by the game of seeking to
accumulate more wealth than the next person. Helping those of us
with privileged statuses to recognize that the game of trying to be as
rich as possible harms them as well would encourage coalition
politics.'73 The privileged will be made more likely to join coalitions if
they are shown that being vulnerable is a constant of the human
condition.
3. Complexity
I agree that vulnerability is complex. There are myriad ways that
we could be physically, mentally, relationally, institutionally, or
otherwise harmed.'74 And those harms can interact with one another
to exacerbate our vulnerabilities.
Nonetheless, the element of complexity requires a major
revision. Vulnerability theory needs to acknowledge that, because of
the scaling of bodies, vulnerabilities have and will continue to be
structured around identities. This was the lesson of Part III.B, which
showed how identities are materially crucial. Moreover, the
structuring of vulnerabilities around identities is far from past. The
literature on implicit bias amply demonstrates that the scaling of
bodies continues to have an afterlife.'7 5 Fineman is right that

173. As the movie Sweet Bird of Youth puts it, "Anyone can be a millionaire, so
everybody's got to try it." See Sweet Bird of Youth, SUBZIN, http://www.subzin.com/
quotes/M4203b9O5/Sweet+Bird+of+Youth/Anyone+can+be+a+millionaire%2C+so+every
body%27s+got+to+try+it (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
174. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268.
175. See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 18, at 46 (explicating implicit bias);

YOUNG, supra note 148, at 128-30 (explicating the scaling of bodies).
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categories of identity are merely "constructed"' 176 but underestimates
the way they continue to have material consequences. Consequently,
the most important revision of vulnerability theory will be the
incorporation of identities theories as an explanation for many forms
of vulnerability.

77

4. Particularity
As with the complexity of vulnerability, the particularity of

vulnerability

seems

to

necessitate

identities

analysis.

Again,

particularity has and will continue to be defined largely by identities.

The significance of the "embodiment" of vulnerabilities stems from
the past and present practice of attaching meanings to particular
forms of embodiment. 78 The use of identities to oppress is not just a
"historical reaction";

79

it is built into Western epistemology in the

form of the scaling of bodies."8 Furthermore, the "stigma" that
attends to holding onto identity groupings stems from the majority's

reaction to minority status, especially when it comes to race. 8' Worse
yet, paralleling a Justice Kennedy-esque antibalkanization rationale
for attacking affirmative action and equal protection laws, 18 which
Fineman clearly does not intend to do,'83 risks blaming the victims of
the scaling of bodies for their own oppression, 8 4 which Fineman
surely does not intend to do. Meanwhile, contrasting multiple

identities with "systems of power"'85 does not hold up, for identities
have themselves been a means of distributing resources that cut
across social institutions.
176.
177.
theory"
Nancy

Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268.
Here, Nancy E. Dowd, Nancy Levit, and Ann C. McGinley's use of "complexity
in order to build a feminist approach to masculinities could be helpful. See, e.g.,
E. Dowd et al., Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in

MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 164, at

25, 26-27, 46.
178. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 269 (discussing embodiment).
179. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637.
180. See YOUNG, supra note 148, at 128-30 (defining scaling of bodies).
181. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637 (arguing identities
stigmatize their holders).
182. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 561-63 (2009) (holding that discarding a fire
fighter test that had a negative disparate impact on racial minorities violated the equal
protection rights of whites); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.").
183. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1754-55 (supporting affirmative
action).
184. See generally WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTiM (1971) (defining and
explaining this term).

185. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 16.

20151

ALWAYS ALREADY SUSPECT

1373

5. A Missing Element: Privilege
Review of Fineman's elements of vulnerability theory calls for a
revision of vulnerability theory that includes identities as an aspect of
complexity and particularity. The way to accomplish that goal is by
incorporating a theory of privilege. Again, a privilege is an unearned
asset automatically conferred by the operation of social norms that
favor your identity. The benefits of a privilege are often invisible,
even to their holders. Analysis of privilege will fit well within
vulnerability theory because vulnerability theory focuses on burdens.
Adding analysis of privilege will better allow us to talk about who is
benefitted by social norms. The revised vulnerability theory will then
be able to explain how systems of power both benefit some identities
and make others more vulnerable. Accordingly, the next Part
advances the revision of vulnerability theory by further explicating
the theory of privilege.
D. Potential Objection to Revising Vulnerability Theory
Before moving on, I want to acknowledge that my critique of
vulnerability theory is subject to objections. For instance, my
challenge to vulnerability theory may hit the theory where it is
weakest and therefore not adequately represent its value. Certainly
there is something to this. After all, vulnerability theory seems
especially valuable for discussing disabilities.'86 Yet, I argue, it fails to
adequately remedy racial profiling. Here the terms of the theory
imply its own critique. Vulnerability theory is a total theory, at least
in the sense that it seeks to explain all of antidiscrimination law and
propounds a general approach to the state. Such a theory cannot
leave out as important an issue as racial profiling without calling itself
into question. The theory of privilege will help us account for racial
profiling within the vulnerabilities framework.
IV. PROPOSAL: REVISE VULNERABILITY THEORY SO THAT IT
ACKNOWLEDGES RELATIVE PRIVILEGE

Nathan W. Pyle describes a great illustration of the concept of
privilege. He saw a high school teacher lead the following exercise.
186. See, e.g., Kate Kaul, Vunerability, for Example: Disability Theory as Extraordinary
Demand, 25 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 81, 97 (2013) (applying vulnerability theory to
disabilities); Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83
WASH. L. REV. 513, 523 (2008) (considering vulnerability theory's application to
disability).
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The students were sitting in rows of desks in a standard classroom.
The teacher gave each student a crumpled piece of paper and then
placed a waste basket in the front of the room. He informed the class
that they represented residents of the United States who wished to
move up to the highest class of wealth. Students who successfully
threw their crumpled paper into the basket from their seat would be
deemed to have moved into the upper class. The students in the back
of the room complained that the exercise was not fair, as they had to
throw their paper balls further than those who were seated in the
front of the class. Students in the front of the class were satisfied with
the rules. The students then took their shots. Most of those in the
front of the room made it, but not all of them. Most of those in the
back of the room did not make it, but some did. The teacher then
acknowledged that those in front had a much better shot of making it
than did those in the back. The teacher also noted that only those in
the back complained about fairness; those in the front concentrated
on their goal and did not notice the unfairness built into the game.187
In this Part of the Article, I add a new element to vulnerability
theory: consideration of how people are differentially privileged.
Section A defines privilege and discusses how its acknowledgement
will alter vulnerability theory. Section B discusses what a revised
vulnerability theory would look like. Section C briefly suggests how a
revised vulnerability theory could be used to justify a federal mandate
to overhaul policing throughout the country.
IncorporatingAnalysis of Privilege into Vulnerability Theory
The metaphor of the privilege game from Pyle's example is
pretty straightforward: some people have built-in advantages in our
supposed meritocracy. We know, for instance, that being born to rich,
highly educated parents advantages you. 8 We know as well that
women, as a group, face "built-in headwinds 189 against their success
A.

187. Nathan W. Pyle, This Teacher Taught His Class a Powerful Lesson About
Privilege with a Recycling Bin and Some Scrap Paper, BuZZFEED (Nov. 21, 2014),

http://www.buzzfeed.com/nathanwpyle/this-teacher-taught-his-class-a-powerful-lessonabout-privil#.jxywo42xJ W.
188. See Matt Bruenig, What's More Important:A College Degree or Being Born Rich?,
MATr BRUENIG POL. (June 13, 2013), http://mattbruenig.com/2013/06/13/whats-more-

important-a-college-degree-or-being-born-rich/ (analyzing tables from Pew Economic
Mobility Project describing chances of changing class status); see also Fineman, Responsive
State, supra note 9, at 268 n.57 (describing lack of intergenerational mobility).
189. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)

employment tests to prevent racial minorities from being hired).

(discussing use of
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in business. 9 ° Finally, as I noted in Part I.A of this Article, we know
that racial minorities face implicit bias in a wide array of social
sectors.
The theory of privilege also shows that identities are crucial to
the maintenance of hierarchy. Hence, we tend to uncritically accept
labeling racial minority students who achieve as "acting white," 19'
women who demonstrate strong leadership as "masculine,"' 92 and
conventional gays and lesbians as "straight-acting."' 9 3 In each case,

our common sense way of thinking makes the privileged status the
norm for behavior. Having an identity that is normative automatically
benefits its holders.'94 As I described in Part III.B, racial privilege
operates both because the scaling of bodies assigns negative value to
non-white status 95 and because the white transparency effect makes

experiences and viewpoints most common to whites the invisible
norm. 196 Consequently, the scaling of bodies assigns whites to the
figurative front of the class and blacks and Latinas/os to the figurative
back of the class. The scaling of bodies and the invisibility of norms
also affects women, sexual minorities, and so on. Identities, therefore,
are a principal means by which privilege is maintained in this society.
If it is to create a better society for all, vulnerability theory will have
to acknowledge that identity groups are differentially privileged.
190. See generally, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS & VETA T. RICHARDSON, NEW
MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING?: THE IMPACT OF LAW FIRM COMPENSATION

SYSTEMS ON WOMEN (2010), available at http://worklifelaw.org/Publications/SameGlass
Ceiling.pdf (documenting glass ceiling in law firms).
191.

See, e.g., ANN ARNETT FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE

MAKING OF BLACK MASCULINITY 202-09 (2000) (discussing "acting white" as an implicit
requirement of academic success and put-down).
192. See generally Ann C. McGinley, Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Michelle
Obama: Performing Gender, Race, and Class on the Campaign Trail, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
709 (2009) (contrasting media treatment of Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Michelle
Obama).
193. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 844 (2002) (defining
"straight-acting").
194. See, e.g., KEY CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY 42-43 (Andrew Edgar & Peter
Sedgwick eds., 1999) (discussing benefits of being the norm in a binary opposition). So, it
is not my fault that I was born male in this society, but I need to recognize that it provides
me with certain benefits, not the least of which is having to worry much less about my
safety. See generally Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed:
Perspectives on Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326 (2013)
(introducing a new perspective on identities, law, and culture). Furthermore, I will keep
getting the benefit of male privilege unless I choose to refuse those privileges and/or work
for women's substantive equality. Hence, the concept of privilege can be scary to some
because recognizing it might bring responsibility.
195. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text (describing scaling of bodies).
196. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text (describing white transparency
effect).
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Privilege is also revealed in the extent that white and/or upperclass New Yorkers did not complain about pervasive NYPD targeting
of racial minorities in certain neighborhoods, which may be the result
of their privilege not to notice the problem. As I noted in my Article
Cultural Context Matters:Terry's "Seesaw Effect," white New Yorkers
supported order-maintenance policing as trumpeted by Mayor Rudy
Giuliani because they implicitly knew it would be targeted upon racial
minorities.'97 The cost of racial profiling for the people in the
figurative back of the class was invisible to them. Privilege makes the
costs of differential treatment invisible.
A Revised Vulnerability Theory
The move toward a better society should include vulnerability
theory's critique of autonomy and embrace of interdependence. 98 I
agree with vulnerability theory that the United States of America
needs to wean itself from its over-prioritization of autonomy and
liberty.' 99 We cannot just balance liberty with equality; however, we
must replace our current, oversized notion of liberty with recognition
of the importance of relationships. That would mean significantly
changing our notion of how autonomous people are. We need to
recognize that people are inherently relational. Here, I am thinking of
the work of feminist relational psychologists, such as Carol Gilligan. 2"
Their basic insight is that, from birth, we only develop our individual
sense of self in the context of our relationships with others.20
Since relationships include identities, a revised vulnerability
theory should replace vulnerability theory's universal subject with a
multifaceted one made up of gender, race, sexual orientation, class,
and religious affiliations, among others.2" This multifaceted subject
B.

197. See Cooper, supra note 32, at 866 (arguing white Giuliani voters implicitly
accepted racial profiling); Nunn, supra note 144, at 381 n.2 (discussing stereotype of black
criminality).
198. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A

THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) (critiquing assumption of autonomy, especially in
family law).
199. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1714.
200. See generally TOWARD A FEMINIST DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (Patricia H.
Miller & Ellin Kofsky Scholnick eds., 2000) (collecting articles on relational psychology).
201. See, e.g., Campbell Leaper, The Social Construction and Socialization of Gender
During Development, in TOWARD A FEMINIST DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra
note 200, at 127, 134. See generally CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW
LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (revamping family law around the
importance of varied forms of relationships).
202. See, e.g., LYN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE
CROSSROADS: WOMEN'S PSYCHOLOGY AND GIRLS' DEVELOPMENT 29 (encouraging use
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will be understood as having different aspects at the forefront
depending on the social context. 2 3 In other words, it would be the
multidimensional subject that Fineman rejects. °4 I am hoping,
however, that after reconsidering the cruciality of identities in our
present Western culture, Fineman and other vulnerability theorists
will accept this revision of the theory. Meanwhile, after considering
vulnerability theory, critical race feminists should come to see the
constancy of vulnerability as a basis for productive coalitions
encompassing varied groups and individuals.
Coalition-building among varied groups and individuals will be
aided by vulnerability theory's recognition of how privilege operates.
Recognizing that their privilege advantages them will allow the
figurative front of the class to see that the game itself is corrupt.
Further, vulnerability theory will allow the figurative front of the class
to acknowledge that we are all dependent at some point. They can
now see that there will be other "classrooms" where they will not be
seated in the front, making them vulnerable in those environments.
Since vulnerability theory says that, due to age, natural disaster,
institutional dysfunction, and so forth, there is no exit from
vulnerability, everyone has a stake in the fostering of resilience.
In fostering resilience, I would eschew the current U.S. model,
which checks the federal government with state sovereignty and
balances equality with liberty, and instead prioritize the federal
government and equality of opportunity. To begin, therefore, we
must have a strong state. Vulnerability theory helps us make the case
for that state by creating an affirmative duty for the state to prevent
and redress injuries. The means of fulfilling that duty would be a
continuous reevaluation of whether state institutions, including those
merely supported by it, such as the family, are truly fostering
resilience. Accordingly, the state must have the power and flexibility
to address regional and national problems.
The principle that courts would use to determine whether the
strong state was truly fostering resilience would be a substantive
approach to equality.2 5 As I discussed in Part II.B, vulnerability
theory's approach to substantive equality would assure meaningful
of Listening Guide that considers "who is speaking, in what body... from whose
perspective, in what societal and cultural frameworks...").
203. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 194, at 327-29 (explicating theory of
multidimensional masculinities theory).
204. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 634-35 (criticizing
multidimensional masculinities theory).
205. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1719, 1724-25.
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opportunity for all. Under-educated children, currently taken as a
norm in urban environments, would be an example of state failure.
More specifically, vulnerability theory would now be able to look at
both identities and privileges, so it could recognize both the undertracking of low socioeconomic status boys of color and the silent
shunting of mostly whites into the honors classes as state failures. We
need a vulnerability theory that insists on a responsive state but
makes that state aware of the ways that identities privilege some and
disadvantage others.
C. Revising Racial Profiling
Having concentrated in this Article on revising vulnerability
theory, I will not canvas the extensive racial profiling literature but
will describe one option. It seems to me that in a world governed by a
revised vulnerability theory, young black males could bring a suit for
the failure of police departments to treat them properly. The suit
would be to have the responsive state act strongly by mandating a
nationwide overhaul of police departments. I suggest that this be
accomplished in three steps. First, require the tops of police
departments to make clear declarations of a new day with respect to
racial profiling. Second, change hiring policies into a comprehensive
measure of likelihood not to racially profile. That would mean
seeking college degrees, deemphasizing military backgrounds, testing
for implicit bias, and any other measures necessary. Finally, I suggest
retraining existing beat police officers to avoid racial profiling. Much
more detail will be needed on these measures, but that will be a
project for another day.
CONCLUSION

I wrote this Article because I was both drawn to and concerned
about vulnerability theory. I expressed my concern in Part I, wherein
I detailed the factors contributing to continuing police targeting of
young racial minority men. In Part II, I detailed aspects of
vulnerability theory, emphasizing the value of its acknowledgement of
our interdependence and call for a strong state with a substantive
approach to equality. In Part III, I critiqued other aspects of
vulnerability theory as failing to recognize that there is no universal
subjectivity and that identities are materially crucial. In Part IV, I
started the revision of vulnerability theory by calling for the
incorporation of analysis of privilege.
I end my investigation of vulnerability theory with buoyed hope
that, when linked to analysis of privilege, it can be the capacious
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theory that helps us fight targeting of young racial minority men. If
young men of color are going to continue to be always already suspect
to the police for the foreseeable future-and they are-then
vulnerability theory must recognize that reality by incorporating
recognition of the relative privileges conferred by different identity
statuses. Revising vulnerability theory might be the necessary step
toward a state that is strong enough and principled enough to remedy
the vulnerability of being always already suspect.

